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Abstract: In view of the behavioral approach and the prospect theory, 
the article tries to explain why an alternative is sometimes chosen, which 
compared to other options, leads to a worse and more uncertain expected 
outcome. The example analyzed is D. Trump’s victory in the US presidential 
elections in 2016. The reasons why he won lie in the candidate’s right strategy 
which takes into account the voting behaviour, and especially in the proper 
communication with voters, in the reflection effect and loss aversion. The 
validity of the prospect theory is sought not only in the political choices but 
also by means of a number of own studies examining its basic assumptions in 
Bulgarian conditions. Examples are given of applications in other fields.  
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he article focuses on the paradoxical in terms of rationality public 
elections where voters prefer the candidate or the platform which are 
both more risky and offer less prosperity. The past 2016 will be 
remembered with several examples of similar surprising and seemingly 
irrational events. The British voted to leave the EU. The United States pre-
ferred Donald Trump to Hillary Clinton. In Bulgaria, Rumen Radev decisi-
vely defeated Tsetska Tsacheva, and somehow over 2.5 million Bulgarians 
decided to radically reform the electoral system, changing it into a majority 
election system. There are a lot more examples, but these are enough to detect 
recurring trends. People prefer an alternative which in their opinion gives 
them a worse and more uncertain outcome to the opportunity that gives them 
a safer and better expected outcome.  
Most political analysts and the media explain this paradox with 





low intelligence of voters, dissemination of discriminatory tastes, xenophobia 
and racism, use of manipulative personal political marketing and ‘big data’, 
interference by foreign governments, hacking attacks, and others. Perhaps 
some of these factors really exist, although there is no convincing evidence of 
their ability to critically affect election outcomes.  
The thesis defended in the article is that in order to solve the paradox 
there is no need to refer to human stupidity, ignoble passions and conspiracy 
theories. A more convincing explanation is given by the prospect theory and 
the reflection effect in particular.  
The application of this increasingly popular theoretical tool to the 
issues related to public choice is not new. It dates back to 1988, when George 
Quattrone and Amos Tversky used it to explain why governments gain 
advantage in times of positive economic development, while the opposition 
gain advantage in cases of difficulties. (Quattrone & Tversky, 1988). An 
interesting note on the issue by Christoph Heintz can be seen in the blog of 
the Vienna International Cognition and Culture Institute (ICCI) after the 
announcement of the US election results (Heintz, 2016 (Quattrone & Tversky, 
1988).  
The article aims to adapt and further develop these ideas. First, 
empirical evidence of the reflection effect will be presented by means of 
several own studies. Second, this evidence will be applied to explain the 
outcomes of the 2016 elections in the United States. Finally, examples will be 
given of other potential issues that can be successfully resolved by the 





The ‘reflection effect’ consists in the different attitude towards risk in 
cases of gains and losses (Shermer, 2010, 134-135). A classic proof of the 
effect was given by an experiment made by Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky in 1981 with students from Stanford University and the University of 
British Columbia (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). They had to make a choice out 
of two scenarios. The total number of respondents for each scenario is marked N 
and the percentage of those who chose each option is given in brackets. 
Imagine you work for a disease control center. There is an unusual 
Asian disease which is expected to kill 600 people if no action is taken. You 
have to choose between two programmes aiming to combat the disease. The 
costs for both programmes are the same. You can only choose one 





Scenario 1 [N=152]: 
Programme A: You will save 200 people. (72%) 
Programme B: With a 1/3 probability you will save all 600 people 
while with a probability of two thirds you will not save anyone. (28%)  
In the first scenario, the reference point is that 600 people will die of 
the disease if no action is taken. The outcomes are framed as two possible 
gains, measured by the number of the saved. Programme A offers a certain 
outcome. Programme B –  a probable, although with the same expected value 
as the certain programme: 1/3*600 + 2/3*0 = 200. Participants in the 
experiment definitely preferred the certain perspective, which means that they 
made a risk-averse choice in a case involving positive prospects.  
The other respondents were given a different formulation of the 
alternative programmes: 
Scenario 2 [N=155]: 
Programme C: 400 people will die. (22%) 
Programme D: With a 1/3 probability no one will die, while with a 
probability of two thirds 600 people will die. (78%)  
In the second scenario, prospects are framed as losses measured by the 
number of people who will die of the disease. With programme ‘C’, the loss is 
certain – 400 people will die. With programme ‘D’ it is probable, although 
with the same expected value as with the certain programme: 2/3*0 + 1/3*600 
= 400. The respondents definitely preferred the risk perspective, which means 
that they made a risk-seeking choice in a case involving negative 
prospects.  
Both cases are practically identical. The only difference between them 
is that in the first case prospects are described by the number of saved lives 
while in the second, by the number of lost lives. This change in formulation, 
however, causes a reversal of risk preference: from risk aversion the attitude 
changes to risk seeking. Reversing the attitude to risk when changing the 
description of risk options contradicts the assumptions of the neoclassical 
choice theory because it means that preferences are not double-compatible.  
The Asian disease experiment was subsequently repeated in other 
countries, each time obtaining the same results. In 2016, the experiment was 
also carried out in Bulgaria with students from Nikola Vaptsarov Naval 
Academy. 480 students responded to the first scenario, 122 students to the 
second one. The obtained results did not differ. The certain programme ‘A’ 
with the ‘winning’ scenario received support of 63% and the risk programme 
‘D’ with the ‘losing’ scenario received support of 70%.  
To further verify and clarify the reflection effect, we also conducted 




the same group. 480 students from Nikola Vaptsarov  Naval Academy were 
asked the following questions:  
Which would you prefer? 
Scenario 1. 
A –  Certain profit of 475 BGN. 
B – A probability of 25% to earn 2000 BGN and a probability of 
75% to earn nothing. 
Scenario 2. 
C – Certain loss of 725 BGN. 
D –  A probability of 75% to lose 1000 BGN and a probability of 
25% to lose nothing. 
Although in Scenario 1 the expected value of risk return ‘B’ is higher 
than the certain profit ‘A’, 70% of the respondents prefer the certain gains. 
With profits, respondents prefer not to risk. However, with the same 
respondents, risk aversion changes into risk seeking when losses are expected. 
In Scenario 2, 63% of the respondents choose to risk, i.e. the reflection effect 
is evident.  
The asymmetric attitude towards risk in the reflection effect can be 
easily explained by another asymmetry of human judgments – the 
asymmetric attitude towards losses and gains expressed in a stronger 
sensitivity to losses than to profits. This emotional deformation is known as 
‘loss aversion’ (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).  
Long ago, Adam Smith drew attention to the tendency to loss 
aversion. In his first major work ‘Theory of Moral Sentiments’, he pointed out 
that we suffer more when we fall from a better to a worse situation, than we 
ever enjoy when we rise from a worse to a better (Smith, 1759). Sigmund 
Freud also argued that we seek to avoid pain more than to find pleasure.  
This points to perhaps the most important emotional distortion of 
behaviour, which is completely ignored by traditional economy: we prefer not 
to lose to the option to win. Contrary to the principles of rationality, the 
hedonic impact of loss is more significant than the hedonic impact of 
gains of the same value. Hence, there is one step to the explanation of the 
reflection effect: If loss aversion is more valuable than gains of the same 
value, then people will tend to risk when they expect losses, and will avoid 
risk when they expect gains.  
For instance, a symmetric bet which gives a ½ probability of gaining a 
sum and a ½ probability of losing the same amount is unwanted for most. The 
dissatisfaction of losing a given amount with a probability of ½ is greater than 
the pleasure of the equal profit of the same amount. Expressed by the utility 




amount that can be gained should include a risk premium and be significantly 
greater than the potential loss.  
Loss aversion can be determined and even measured by a simple 
experiment. Imagine a bet: you win X BGN if you toss the heads, and you 
lose 100 BGN if you toss the tails. How much should X be to agree to make 
the bet? For most people the answer is about 225 BGN i.e. the prospect of 
winning 225 BGN is equal to the prospect of losing 100 BGN (Kahneman, 
2012). This means that loss hurts 2,25 times more strongly  than profit is 
enjoyed. A close average amount of 196 BGN was also determined in an own  
survey conducted in 2015 with the participation of 254 students from Nikola 
Vaptsarov Naval Academy. These results (as well as the research results 
obtained in many other places) make it possible to define the following 
practical rule: the likelihood of a loss is almost twice as stronger argument 
as the probability of profit of the same value, and if an activity can lead 
to a loss, the same will be worth only if it can give at least twice as much 
profit.  
The fear of loss and asymmetric treatment of losses and gains may 
well lead to inconsistent decisions depending on whether the solutions are 
framed as profits or losses. In the identical scenarios presented earlier, the 
change of formulation causes a significant proportion of participants to 
change their choice. A great number of other experiments substantiate this 
result (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006).  
The consequence is that with appropriate ‘framing’, the attitude to risk 
and the prospects of choice can change significantly. The way to achieve this 
is by choosing a suitable reference point of choice. To clarify, let us 
imagine a middle-aged man having 400,000 BGN. According to the standard 
economic interpretation, utility functions U=U(X), which measure individual 
happiness, are positive towards the X results and its utility should be positive. 
In fact, this is not certain. The reason is that perception depends on the 
reference point. If this is how much money people in his social circle have, 
and for example, they have an average of one million, he will have the feeling 
that he is at a loss. If the important thing is that his fortune was estimated at 2 
m a year ago, he would probably not be happy either. Unless he had the 
expectation that his wealth would vanish completely during that year. 
The example demonstrates that it is more proper to take into account 
relative, rather than absolute outcomes. The easiest way to do this is to 
select a reference point ‘R’ towards which to measure the ‘X’ results. If the 
reference point is zero, there will be no difference to the standard economic 
interpretation. However, if the reference point is different, the utility estimate 
will be different. At first glance, the reference point does not radically change 




point ‘R’. However, this is not the case. The change is radical due to the fact 
that the reference point that decision makers use is chosen by the 
automatic system of thinking, making it subjective and subject to their 
emotions and intuition. The position of the reference point and the 
corresponding interpretation of the outcomes in the form of profits or losses 
may vary, depending on the context of choosing and framing the prospects 
suggested (as it is with the Asian disease) or on the change in the expectations 
of decision makers (the ‘hedonic adaptation’ phenomenon).  
For instance, a reference point may be the status quo, i.e. the current 
state, the past welfare or consumption, the expectations, some social point of 
reference such as the income of others or the change of own income towards 
the change of the income of others, etc. In the example, the utility function 
will be of the type U=U(X-R), and if wealth is assumed to be the reference 
point a year ago, the utility will be U(-1.6 m BGN); if the wealth of others is 
assumed, it will be U(-0.6 m); and if the expectations are assumed, it will be 
positive – U(0.4 m BGN). Depending on the choice of a reference point, 
estimates of the utility would be heterogeneous and sometimes incompatible.  
When we combine ideas about the different attitudes to risk with 
profits and gains, loss aversion and the dependence of the estimates on the 
choice of a reference point with decreasing marginal utility, we come to the 
basic theoretical instrument of the behavioral economy – the ‘prospect 
theory’ (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
Unlike the utility function of the traditional for the economic analyses 
expected utility theory, which measures utility as a function of absolute 
wealth and is concave, the one of the prospect theory has an S-shape (see 
Figure 1) and the following characteristics: 1) It measures losses and benefits 
towards a reference point; 2) It is concave in cases of benefits (above the 
reference point) and convex in cases of a loss (below the reference point). 
This is due to the decreasing marginal utility and the reflection effect. 3) In 
the reference point it is asymmetrical and bending: the curve is sloping in 
cases of gains and it is steeper in cases of a loss. This is due to the role of the 
reference value and loss aversion.  
 
 
The reflection effect in the battle for votes  
 
The outcomes in the case of the political struggle between Clinton and 
Trump are shown in Figure 1. With some corrections, the presentation repeats 












According to most analysts and voters, Clinton is both the lesser ‘evil’ 
and the less risky choice. The thing, then, that brings Trump’s victory can be 
explained by pursuing two strategies aiming at the first phase of the selection 
process – framing.1  
Trump’s first strategy is to create a sense of dissatisfaction with the 
status quo and to frame the political vote as a choice in conditions of 
uncertainty and probable loss of prosperity. Focusing on topics such as 
“Take Back Control”, “Make America Strong Again”, “Recover Jobs” draws 
the attention on today’s losses towards past positions, and establishes as a 
reference point a previous state towards which the present and probably the 
future state of affairs will be a loss.    
Towards this reference point, most voters expect both Clinton and 
Trump’s government to lead to a loss. With Clinton, because she tends to 
                                                            
1 The prospect theory distinguishes two phases in the selection process: framing and 
valuation. During the framing phase, decision makers construct mental representations of 
actions, unforeseen circumstances, and consequences related to a decision. During the 
valuation phase, they weigh the utility (a term replaced by Kahneman and Tversky with 











continue the status quo, and the status quo is perceived as a loss. Trump also 
creates a sense of loss because his personal qualities, experience and political 
positions give rise to a strong doubt that he will cope with presidential duties. 
So American voters had to choose the lesser of two evils.  
It is true that H. Clinton and her team made a lot of attempts to avoid 
this reference point and replace it with another one – “What the situation was 
before Barack Obama took the lead”. However, they did not properly evaluate 
the behavioral reactions of the voters. Their messages were mind-centered, 
and statistics and facts about economic growth, unemployment, poverty and 
crime prevailed. Although it looks right, it is impractical. Most voters rarely 
think thoroughly when deciding who to vote for; they avoid analyzing 
political platforms, and ignore the logic and statistics they are attacked with 
by Clinton’s headquarters. Clinton’s approach requires a mental effort by the 
audience, and people are usually distancing themselves from anything that 
reminds them or requires making efforts. Paradoxically, when a simple and 
straightforward explanation is offered, people not only perceive it quickly and 
effortlessly, but they also like it more, and consider it more serious and 
worthwhile (Cialdini, 2016, p. 184).  
Trump’s messages were much more sensitive to human nature and 
to the fact established by Kahneman and Tversky that thinking is dual and 
predominantly automatic rather than rational (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
This also applies to political elections. Research has shown that uninformed 
and viewing too much TV voters decide who to vote for on the basis of the 
direct impulses of the automatic system, which provides quick and intuitive 
assessments and is highly dependent on emotions. The attributes of 
competence, assessed not by the analysis of platforms and statistical facts, but 
mostly by the shape and expression of the face, the body language and the 
intonation of the candidates, are determinant for them (Kahneman, 2012).  
In response to Clinton’s appeal to the reflective systems of voters, 
Trump turns to automatic thinking – he draws attention to scandalous 
statements about women, veterans, Latin Americans and Muslims, and 
ironical remarks to his political opponents, thereby expanding his original 
marginal positions; he replaces the issues of debate with easier ones, 
activating stereotypical reactions (immigrants, minorities, jobs, power and 
control of the media and politicians); he offers emotionally charged 
arguments to help prevent avoiding loss by voters (“We lost control over 
Washington”, “Illegal immigrants steal your jobs, while China and Mexico 
take your business”, “You lost your security”, “They took away our 
confidence in the future”); he triggers group mechanisms for identification 
and protection, opposing “me and you, together” to “them”; he offers 




clear messages he creates an ‘illusion of understanding’ and control; his 
decisions are urgent and do not offer alternative (“This is the last chance to 
regain your social and financial status”).  
The facts show that voters, even those who are well informed, vote not 
according to their personal beliefs on political issues but are guided by their 
social identity and party loyalty (Achen & Bartels, 2016). That is why Trump 
exploits to the full potential the party loyalty of the Republican Party’s 
supporters along with adding messages directly addressing the groups who 
have lost part of their economic and social status in recent years (the 
unemployed and the white men who have jobs but without college education) 
and the electoral regions (the so-called ‘rusty’ states – Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
Michigan and Wisconsin). This activates the voters, important for his strategy, 
and suppresses the desire of those he does not care about, to vote.  
Proper targeting of political messages at the groups of losers and 
offering them in an easy-to-see and perceive form are the keys to expanding 
Trump’s political influence. A number of studies prove that messages which 
are better ‘visible’ to ‘target groups’ are probably the most important factor 
for the pre-suasion effect of each message (Cialdini, 2016). Whether 
messages are true or superficial and fake is irrelevant to their perception, 
because the most important thing for them to be approved by voters’ minds is 
whether they are clearly exposed and perceived with cognitive ease. Visibility 
directs automatic attention, while cognitive ease creates a sense of truth and 
gains credibility2 (Kahneman, 2012).  
                                                            
2 To test the effect of cognitive ease, in an own  study, conducted in 2015, we asked 
254 students three questions that provoke cognitively easy, and yet in most cases, wrong 
answers. The three questions repeated with small modifications the formulations of Shane 
Frederick’s Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005). The first question was: “A tennis 
racket and a can of balls (together) cost 110 BGN. The tennis racket alone costs 100 BGN 
more than the can of balls. How much do the can of balls cost?”. Most participants (64.52%) 
chose the impulsive answer – 10 BGN. It is intuitive and yet wrong. An elementary check 
indicates that if the balls are 10 BGN and the rocket is 100 BGN more expensive, the total 
price would be 120, not 110 BGN. However, the cognitive ease of the answer prevents one 
from doubting it and doing this check. Therefore, only 31.76% of the participants, students at 
technical universities who do not have any problems with mathematics and yet have the time 
they need, indicated the correct answer – 5 BGN. A similar result was obtained with the 
second question: “If it takes 5 minutes for 5 machines to manufacture 5 appliances, how long 
would it take for 100 machines to manufacture 100 appliances?” The correct answer – 5 
minutes – was only indicated by 29.80% of the participants. The majority – 54.94% – 
indicated the easy answer of 100 minutes. The third question was: “In a lake, there is a patch 
of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the 
entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half the lake?” 41% of the 
respondents indicated the correct answer. A large number chose the impulsive answer – 24 
days. However, that question was probably perceived by the participants as cognitively more 




A number of sociological studies substantiated Trump’s good 
communication strategy, but they also revealed that it was not enough to 
compensate for his weaknesses. They indicated that the expected outcome in 
case he governed would be worse than it was expected if Clinton governed the 
country. Returning to the model in Figure 1, the expected outcome with 
Clinton is marked as ERC, and that with Trump as ERТ, ERC > ERТ. That 
would make Trump unelectable. However, his second strategy started taking 
effect.  
Compared to Clinton, he builds a more unpredictable image, making 
the outcome of his government much less secure. Attitudes towards 
Clinton’s government are related to continuity and taking small risks. In the 
figure, the deviations from the expected outcome in case she governs, the ERC 
is between C- and C+, and those for Trump’s government fluctuate much 
more around the expected ERТ result – from T- and T+. Figuratively 
speaking, they move from destroying everything to being able to honour his 
promises to ‘revive’ America.  
For the purposes of our analysis, it is irrelevant whether Trump’s 
‘risky’ image is deliberately built or not. What is important is that due to the 
reflection effect and the tendency to risk when anticipating a loss, the stronger 
fluctuation around the expected outcome creates an advantage and a condition 
that the expected utility of his government EUТ proves to be higher than the 
expected utility of Clinton’s government EUC (see Figure 1). When voters 
anticipate a loss, the argument “I will ensure stability and predictability” 
works against the candidate and invalidates their “I know more and I can 
more” messages even when the latter are perceived as credible. An example 
for this is not only Hillary Clinton’s unsuccessful campaign in the US, but 
also Tsetska Tsacheva’s campaign in Bulgaria. Similarly, the UK supporters 
of Britain being part of the EU were wrong in insisting that the exit hides 
greater risks. When people are not satisfied with the prospects, 





answer, compared to the previous two questions. The results are not surprising. In the study, 
to all the three questions, 29.9% indicated the wrong answer, while in the original Frederick 
study, involving 3428 students – 33%. At least one wrong answer was given by 85.1% of the 
surveyed students in our own study and 83% of the students in the Frederick study. 
Obviously, even if people understand mathematics and logic enough, and although they can 
solve the problem in general, they rarely use their knowledge. They tend to give the first 
answer that comes to their mind and do not question this answer if it is obtained with 






The analysis demonstrates that it is entirely rational for the majority to 
make a choice leading to an expected worse and more uncertain outcome than 
its alternatives. This is not a consequence of information problems, voters’ 
educational and intellectual deficits or manipulations, but a natural product of 
the reflection effect. The reason why in times of crisis voters often support 
radical politicies and politicians is that they try to avoid losses and make 
disproportionate efforts to re-establish their positions when they feel they are 
losing.  
Support for the Brexit, the ‘non-systematic’ politicians of the Trump 
type, and even for the ‘Islamic State’ is a practical proof, while application of 
the analysis can also be found in questions such as why students cheat in 
exams and why those who have lost a positive perspective are more prone to 
risk and deviant behaviour.  
Similar behavioral responses also imply conclusions about the 
methods by which the desired effect can be achieved. For instance, fear of 
deteriorated reputation and sanctions to be used as key motivators rather than 
enouragement (the power of sanctions will be similar to twice as considerable 
encouragement); taxation to use primarily taxes levied at the source rather 
than those to be paid subsequently; unemployment benefits to be initially 
higher than the established levels but to decrease over time, to arouse a 
feeling of higher losses and to encourage the unemployed to take risks and 
readily accept jobs offers; training to be based on mistakes rather than on 
good examples; marketing to focus on missed benefits rather than on benefits 
received (“you will lose ... if not ...” instead of “you will win ... if ...”); 
dietetics – on health damage from excess weight and the high risk of early 
death rather than on how better thinner people feel; the fight against smoking 
– on the harm to health rather than on reducing expenses.  
One must be careful, of course, when using fear, because instead of 
convincing people it can lead to a denial of the problem. People have enough 
mechanisms to reduce anxiety if it is too much – over-optimism is triggered 
(“it will not happen to me”) or refuge is found in self-deception (“by the time 
consequences occur, a solution will be found”). Therefore, it is always 
important to carefully filter out the facts about consequences and to expose 
them to their full extent along with proposing a particular solution formulated 
through practicable steps. Similar approach works well everywhere – from the 
fight against overweight and smoking (Blanton, Snyder, Strauts, & Larson, 
2014) to counteracting climate change and global warming (Feinberg & 




The reflection effect and loss aversion are also important in explaining 
a number of issues difficult for the traditional economic theory. They could be 
the main cause of the following: sellers and buyers find it difficult to reach an 
agreement and good deals are not signed (Knetsch, 1989); investors do not 
close down losing positions, even when they are aware of the little chances 
they have for improving them, and close down profitable positions too 
quickly due to the excessive fear that the market could change and they would 
lose (Odean, 1998) (Fisher, 2003); consumers are differently susceptible to 
price increases and decreases (Hardie, Johnson, & Fader, 1993); bad news on 
income does not affect consumption (Shea, 1995); credit card fees are 
included in prices (Thaler & Sunshine, 2014); potential losses of pre-received 
bonuses has a stronger impact than potential benefits of a bonus after 
obtaining the outcome (Fryer, Levitt, List, & Sadoff, 2012), etc.   
When studying the above mentioned, as well as many other events, the 
prospect theory has significant comparative advantages over traditional 
approaches. Although it does not aim at explaining everything, it can 
successfully improve the understanding of human behaviour and allow for 
more accurate predictions and more effective impact policies and instruments 
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